Rezim Perubahan Iklim Global Lingkup Tantangan Perubahan iklim adalah salah satu ancaman paling signifikan yang dihadapi dunia saat ini. Menurut American Meteorological Society, ada kemungkinan 90 persen bahwa suhu global akan meningkat 3,5 sampai 7,4 derajat Celsius (6,3 sampai 13,3 derajat Fahrenheit) dalam waktu kurang dari seratus tahun, dengan kenaikan tanah dan kutub yang lebih besar lagi. Pergeseran suhu yang tampaknya kecil ini dapat memicu bencana yang meluas dalam bentuk kenaikan permukaan air laut, pola cuaca yang kejam dan tidak bergejolak, penggurunan, kelaparan, kekurangan air, dan efek sekunder lainnya termasuk konflik. Pada bulan November 2011, Badan Energi Internasional memperingatkan bahwa dunia dapat dengan cepat mendekati titik kritis mengenai perubahan iklim, dan menyarankan agar lima tahun ke depan akan sangat penting untuk upaya pengurangan gas rumah kaca. Menghindari konsekuensi terburuk dari perubahan iklim akan memerlukan pengurangan besar emisi gas rumah kaca global. Manusia menghasilkan gas rumah kaca dengan membakar batubara, minyak, dan gas alam untuk menghasilkan energi untuk daya, panas, industri, dan transportasi. Deforestasi dan aktivitas pertanian juga menghasilkan emisi yang berubah iklim. Salah satu cara untuk mengurangi emisi adalah beralih dari pembangkit berbasis bahan bakar fosil ke sumber energi alternatif, seperti nuklir, solar, dan angin. Pilihan kedua yang paralel adalah mencapai efisiensi energi yang lebih besar dengan mengembangkan teknologi baru dan memodifikasi perilaku sehari-hari sehingga setiap orang menghasilkan jejak karbon yang lebih kecil. Selain itu, membangun perkuatan gedung dan mengembangkan teknologi hemat energi sangat membantu mengurangi emisi gas rumah kaca. Semua tindakan semacam itu menghasilkan biaya yang signifikan, dan permulaan krisis keuangan global telah menempatkan hambatan baru yang serius pada anggaran nasional baik di negara maju maupun dunia berkembang. Beberapa ahli perubahan iklim telah menyatakan keprihatinannya bahwa krisis keuangan global yang sedang berlangsung dapat menunda tindakan terhadap perubahan iklim tanpa batas waktu. Bahkan jika reformasi semacam itu dilaksanakan, upaya substansial masih harus disesuaikan dengan perubahan yang tidak dapat dihindari. Peristiwa terkait iklim terkini, seperti banjir di Pakistan dan Thailand. Telah menyebabkan fokus untuk jatuh pada pembiayaan adaptasi untuk negara-negara berkembang, yang dapat mendukung proyek infrastruktur untuk melindungi daerah-daerah yang rentan. Upaya lain mungkin termasuk pertanian toleran kekeringan. Distribusi emisi global memperkuat kebutuhan akan kerjasama multilateral yang luas dalam mengurangi perubahan iklim. Lima belas sampai dua puluh negara bertanggung jawab atas kira-kira 75 persen emisi global. Tapi tidak ada satu negara yang menyumbang lebih dari 26 persen. Upaya untuk mengurangi mitigasi emisi harus bersifat global. Tanpa kerja sama dan koordinasi internasional, beberapa negara bagian dapat bebas melakukan upaya lain, atau bahkan memanfaatkan kontrol emisi yang tidak merata untuk mendapatkan keunggulan kompetitif. Dan karena dampak perubahan iklim akan dirasakan di seluruh dunia, upaya untuk beradaptasi dengan adaptasi perubahan iklim juga perlu bersifat global. Pada peluncuran Konvensi Kerangka Kerja Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa tentang Perubahan Iklim Konferensi Ketujuh belas (COP-17) di Durban, Afrika Selatan, banyak pakar perubahan iklim khawatir bahwa Protokol Kyoto dapat berakhir pada tahun 2012 tanpa persetujuan hukum yang mengikat secara nasional mengenai pembatasan global Emisi di tempat Ketakutan ini, bagaimanapun, agak terbantu karena hampir dua ratus negara hadir pada COP-17 menyetujui perpanjangan protokol tersebut sampai tahun 2017 dan berpotensi 2020. Sebuah keputusan juga dicapai pada pertemuan tersebut untuk merancang penggantinya sesuai dengan Protokol Kyoto oleh 2015, yang pada akhirnya akan mulai berlaku pada tahun 2020. Delegasi juga membayangkan bahwa kesepakatan baru tersebut akan mencakup target emisi gas rumah kaca untuk semua negara, terlepas dari tingkat perkembangan ekonomi mereka. Kerangka kerja ini terutama kontras dengan Protokol Kyoto, yang terutama berfokus pada pengurangan emisi yang berasal dari negara maju. Meskipun ini dan keberhasilan lain yang ditandai selama COP-17, kurangnya kepemimpinan yang dirasakan oleh pemain sentral dalam debat perubahan iklim terutama Amerika Serikat telah menimbulkan kekhawatiran yang meningkat mengenai prospek jangka panjang rezim perubahan iklim global. Selain itu, keputusan Canadas Desember 2011 untuk menarik diri dari Protokol Kyoto berdasarkan pada masalah ekonomi domestik dan juga pandangannya bahwa penghasil gas rumah kaca teratas dunia telah menolak untuk meratifikasi kesepakatan tersebut sehingga menimbulkan kekhawatiran bahwa Protokol Kyoto sendiri mungkin dalam bahaya keruntuhan. Kedua kekhawatiran ini dan banyak isu lainnya kemungkinan akan menjadi bagian dari agenda COP-18, yang dijadwalkan November 2012 di Qatar. Kekuatan dan Kelemahan Penilaian keseluruhan: Sistem yang terbelakang dan tidak memadai Pusat utama aksi multilateral untuk melawan perubahan iklim adalah Konvensi Kerangka Kerja Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa mengenai Perubahan Iklim (UNFCCC), Protokol Kyoto yang terkait. Kesepakatan Kopenhagen. Dan Platform Durban untuk Aksi yang Disempurnakan (Durban Platform) COP-17 Durban. Protokol Kyoto mencakup komitmen kuat untuk mengekang emisi hanya dari negara maju, namun tidak termasuk Amerika Serikat, dan tidak memiliki konsekuensi yang berarti karena ketidakpatuhan, hal itu juga telah terjadi di bawah tekanan yang belum pernah terjadi sebelumnya saat Kanada secara resmi mengundurkan diri dari kesepakatan tersebut pada bulan Desember 2011. Secara khusus, Canadas Menteri lingkungan mengusulkan bahwa Kanada hanya bisa menjadi bagian dari kesepakatan yang mencakup semua pemancar utama sebagai partai. Karena Jepang dan Rusia bisa segera mengikuti contoh Canadas, harapan akan iklim yang mengikat secara hukum bahkan jika desirablemay memudar. Selain itu, rezim tersebut, yang mengizinkan banyak pengecualian mengenai emisi gas rumah kaca, gagal memberikan pemancar besar yang muncul seperti China dan India dengan target dan insentif yang berarti untuk mengekang emisi mereka. Arsitektur untuk tata kelola iklim global tampak sangat goyah setelah Konferensi Para Pihak kelima belas (COP-15), di Kopenhagen, gagal mengatasi perbedaan yang mengakar di antara partai-partai besar dan memberikan pengurangan emisi yang ditargetkan. Setelah Kopenhagen, COP-16, di Cancun, melakukan beberapa langkah menuju tindakan multilateral yang efektif, namun rezim tersebut masih gagal untuk mempromosikan tindakan yang diperlukan untuk menghasilkan perubahan positif, termasuk melakukan kerangka kerja pascaKyoto. Demikian pula, sedikit kemajuan dicapai selama pertemuan COP-17 di Durban. Sementara pihak-pihak sepakat untuk memperpanjang Protokol Kyoto sampai setidaknya 2017 dan juga memperkuat sebuah struktur operasi untuk Green Climate Fund, sedikit yang diklarifikasi mengenai bentuk penerus sesuai dengan Protokol Kyoto. Delegasi ke COP-17 setuju bahwa kesepakatan baru tersebut akan mencakup target pengurangan untuk semua negara, dan bukan secara eksklusif yang dipertimbangkan untuk dikembangkan. Meskipun delegasi di Durban, Cancun, dan Copenhagen mengembangkan mekanisme pelaporan, janji pendanaan, dan tujuan pengurangan emisi spesifik negara yang dinyatakan secara sepihak, kurangnya penegakan hukum internasional yang terus berlanjut telah membuat janji-janji ini sebagian besar kosong. Keterbatasan Platform Durban. Serta status Protokol Kyoto yang semakin lemah, telah menciptakan sebuah keharusan baru bagi tindakan global mengenai perubahan iklim. Ketegangan antara negara-negara berkembang dan negara maju didorong oleh ketidaksepakatan yang sedang berlangsung mengenai bagaimana menafsirkan fondasi fundamental kerangka UNFCCC dan Kyoto, prinsip tanggung jawab bersama namun berbeda di antara negara-negara industri (Annex I) dan negara-negara berkembang (non-Annex I) Terutama ketika harus menetapkan dan mencapai target mitigasi yang berarti. KTT perubahan iklim PBB 2010 di Cancun tidak mencapai kerangka kerja internasional yang komprehensif, juga tidak mengharapkannya. Agenda tersebut didorong ke pertemuan tahun 2011 di Durban, Afrika Selatan, di mana Protokol Kyoto diperpanjang setidaknya lima tahun ke depan. Kekhawatiran, bagaimanapun, muncul karena penolakan India, China, dan Amerika Serikat untuk secara tegas menyetujui target penerimaan yang mengikat secara hukum pada pertemuan tersebut, dengan mempertimbangkan adanya keraguan bahwa penghasil gas rumah kaca signifikan lainnya akan berpartisipasi dalam jendela komitmen baru. Pada tingkat yang paling dasar, negara tidak setuju mengenai ketentuan pemantauan iklim dan pembiayaan dalam Protokol Kyoto dan kesepakatan yang mengikat secara hukum lainnya. Kerangka kerja iklim berjuang untuk secara efektif memantau produksi gas rumah kaca, terutama di negara-negara berkembang. Banyak negara tidak memiliki kapasitas domestik untuk mengaudit total emisi mereka walaupun mereka dapat memantau tingkat nasional, beberapa di antaranya khawatir bahwa pelaporan jumlah tersebut akan mendorong tekanan internasional untuk membatasi emisi mereka. Lainnya, seperti China, berpendapat bahwa sistem pemantauan internasional merupakan pelanggaran terhadap kedaulatan nasional dan bahwa negara-negara berkembang harus diberi keringanan keringanan dalam emisi karena mereka saat ini dalam tahap-tahap kritis dalam pembangunan ekonomi. Selain itu, rezim iklim tidak secara memadai menangani sumber pembiayaan yang dibutuhkan untuk membantu negara-negara berkembang mengatasi perubahan iklim. Sementara pertemuan di Kopenhagen menyaksikan kemajuan politik, termasuk janji oleh negara-negara industri untuk menyediakan 100 miliar pada tahun 2020 ke negara-negara maju dan Dana Iklim Hijau diberlakukan di Cancun, aliran dana konkret belum terwujud. Sementara COP-17 berusaha untuk mengklarifikasi bagaimana Green Climate Fund akan mengoperasikan dan menyebarkan dana, sedikit dukungan moneter yang kuat dialokasikan untuk mekanisme tersebut. Sampai saat ini, total dana yang disalurkan untuk inisiatif perubahan iklim. Baik di dalam maupun di luar UNFCCC, hanya mencapai 2,1 miliar. Mencari pendekatan yang lebih fleksibel dan efektif, Amerika Serikat dan pemancar lainnya mulai beralih ke multilateralisme la carte, dengan fokus pada kerangka kerja yang lebih kecil dan tidak formal, seperti Major Econonomies Forum (MEE) dan Kelompok Dua Puluh (G20). MEF diluncurkan pada bulan Maret 2009 sebagai penerus pemerintahan Bush Major Economies Meeting (MEM). MEF yang beranggotakan tujuh belas anggota, yang mencakup negara-negara yang bertanggung jawab atas sekitar 80 persen emisi global, telah menyediakan arena bagi negara-negara pemancar utama untuk menghadapi masalah-masalah rumit dan menerapkan strategi yang layak tanpa memasuki labirin diplomasi PBB. Pada bulan Februari 2012, sebuah koalisi enam negara juga dibentuk untuk mengatasi risiko iklim dan publik dan kesehatan yang ditimbulkan oleh polutan berumur pendek termasuk metana, hidrofluorokarbon, dan karbon hitam (jelaga). Bahkan fora niche ini, bagaimanapun, tidak kebal terhadap dendam politik atas pemotongan emisi yang mengikat secara hukum. Terlepas dari kekhawatiran bahwa upaya alternatif untuk proses UNFCCC dapat merusak kredibilitas dan keberhasilan forum universal tersebut, MEF dan G20 paralel memiliki potensi untuk melengkapi jalur PBB dengan memungkinkan dialog yang bermakna antara negara-negara yang komitmen keuangan dan solusi mengenai mitigasi dan teknologi Benar-benar penting MEF dan G20 menawarkan kepada para pemimpin sebuah setting untuk dialog yang jujur dimana para pihak dapat bertemu untuk menegosiasikan pengaturan bilateral dan lateril baru, menyelaraskan inisiatif domestik paralel dan pendekatan peraturan, dan memantau satu sama lain kemajuan sebagai bagian dari proses informal, pledge and review. Pencapaian MEF dan G20 mencakup, meluncurkan Kemitraan Global untuk Energi Bersih dan mencapai kesepakatan untuk menghapus subsidi bahan bakar fosil yang tidak efisien. Pada bulan September 2011, MEF dilaporkan mengadakan diskusi terbuka mengenai pertemuan COP-17 di Durban dan masa depan Protokol Kyoto di antara isu-isu lainnya. Di luar proses UNFCCC dan forum minilateral seperti MEF dan G20, perubahan iklim semakin banyak ditangani oleh sejumlah pelaku internasional lainnya yang mandat utamanya tidak secara eksplisit memasukkan perubahan iklim. Dalam sistem PBB saja, sekitar dua puluh agen bekerja untuk perubahan iklim, seringkali melalui lensa khusus mereka sendiri. Pelaksanaan proyek, misalnya, tersebar di berbagai institusi seperti United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Global Environment Facility (GEF), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), dan Bank Dunia. Yang bekerja sama dengan badan-badan bilateral mengenai proyek mitigasi dan adaptasi di negara-negara berkembang. Meskipun proliferasi aktor yang berfokus pada agenda ini tidak harus negatif, kurangnya kebijakan dan program terkoordinasi dapat menjadi masalah saat mengarah pada redundansi. Sebagian fragmentasi ini mencerminkan kompleksitas perubahan iklim yang inheren, yang memiliki hubungan substantif dengan banyak bidang isu, termasuk pembangunan, keuangan, kesehatan masyarakat, energi, dan keamanan. Memahami ancaman perubahan iklim: Kuat namun dapat ditingkatkan Rezim iklim internasional sangat kuat dalam memahami ancaman yang ditimbulkan oleh perubahan iklim. Upaya semacam itu, yang berpusat pada Panel Antarpemerintah tentang Perubahan Iklim (IPCC), mendahului elemen rezim yang lain. Namun, infiltrasi politik ke dalam debat perubahan iklim telah menghambat legitimasi dan pervasiveness temuan baru. IPCC dibuat pada tahun 1988 untuk meninjau, menilai, dan mensintesis informasi ilmiah dunia yang terkait dengan perubahan iklim. Ini secara berkala merilis laporan penilaian. Yang mensintesis data global tentang perubahan iklim. Laporan IPCC PDF berperan penting dalam diskusi kebijakan mengenai perubahan iklim, dan perkiraan mereka memainkan peran luar biasa dalam menetapkan tolok ukur untuk tindakan internasional. IPCC juga menghasilkan laporan sesekali mengenai pokok-pokok yang mendesak seperti penangkapan karbon dan transfer teknologi. IPCC bukan tanpa kritiknya, namun, dan serangkaian skandal mengenai metode pelaporannya agak melemahkan legitimasinya. Beberapa orang menuduh laporannya secara politis didorong oleh ringkasan mereka harus ditandatangani oleh semua pemerintah anggota dan terlalu menekankan kesepakatan kesepakatan tentang perubahan iklim buatan manusia. Bereaksi terhadap temuan review independen, IPCC memperkenalkan bentuk institusional pada bulan Mei 2011 untuk menangani beberapa masalah ini. Konon, temuan panel umumnya sesuai dengan asosiasi ilmiah utama PDF. Seperti Akademi Ilmu Pengetahuan A. S. Nasional. Dalam komunitas ahli ilmu iklim, hanya sedikit yang percaya bahwa laporan IPCC melebih-lebihkan keadaan masalah. IPCC juga telah dikritik, dari sisi lain, karena kurang memperhatikan risiko perubahan iklim yang ekstrem, sekali lagi karena kebutuhan akan konsensus politik. Demikian pula, telah dikritik karena tertinggal dari sains saat ini karena proses persetujuannya yang panjang dan birokratis. Pada saat banyak penelitian meningkatkan kemungkinan perubahan iklim yang ekstrem, ini mungkin cenderung bias IPCC secara konservatif. Kerja sama internasional dalam pengamatan ilmiah dan analisis juga mendapat manfaat dari beberapa forum lain untuk berbagi data iklim global. Ini termasuk Group on Earth Observations (GEO), sebuah kelompok yang terdiri dari delapan puluh pemerintah yang berkomitmen untuk menciptakan Sistem Pengamatan Global Earth Systems (GEOSS) sebagai sumber umum untuk data terperinci mengenai segala hal yang berkaitan dengan perubahan iklim. Terlepas dari keuntungan dalam meneliti, menganalisis, dan memahami perubahan iklim, banyak karya ilmiah dasar tetap ada dalam mengklarifikasi opini ilmiah mengenai penyebab antropogenik perubahan iklim dan cara untuk mengurangi dampaknya. Selain itu, masyarakat internasional perlu memperluas upaya kerjasama dalam mengumpulkan data tentang dampak perubahan iklim untuk memfasilitasi sistem adaptasi dan peringatan dini. Mengurangi emisi: Beberapa kemajuan, tapi terlalu sedikit komitmen Banyak negara dengan target wajib di bawah Protokol Kyoto berada di jalur untuk mengurangi emisi gas rumah kaca mereka, dan penghasil emisi besar seperti China, India, dan Brasil menyarankan agar mereka mengambil langkah-langkah sukarela untuk mengendalikan tingkat Dari polusi antropogenik. Namun, terlepas dari keberhasilan ini, rezim iklim yang ada tetap sangat tidak memadai dalam hal menstabilkan tingkat gas rumah kaca, peraturan yang telah disahkan atau yang akan diberlakukan, seperti pajak pesawat UE, terus menimbulkan kontroversi politik yang signifikan. Selain itu, Platform Durban bulan Desember 2011 membuat partai-partai UNFCCC membentuk kesepakatan postKyoto yang lebih universal dengan kekuatan hukum, dan pada bulan Desember 2012 di COP-18 UNFCCC, para pihak sepakat untuk memperpanjang periode komitmen Kyoto sampai tahun 2020 dan untuk melakukan negosiasi untuk sebuah perjanjian Untuk menggantikan Protokol Kyoto pada tahun 2015. Namun, tidak semua pihak menyetujui putaran kedua komitmen dan pemancar utama seperti Kanada dan Jepang memilih keluar. Perbedaan antara komitmen dan tindakan tetap menjadi hambatan bagi pengembangan solusi yang komprehensif. Perjanjian Kopenhagen yang tidak mengikat tidak banyak memaksa akuntabilitas dan tindakan negara-negara. Perjanjian Cancun 2010 membawa janji pengurangan gas rumah kaca di bawah naungan Konvensi Kerangka Kerja PBB tentang Perubahan Iklim, namun tetap harus dilihat apakah Cancuns meminta penilaian internasional atas pelaksanaan upaya mitigasi ini akan menghasilkan keuntungan substantif di luar status quo. Pergeseran fokus dari diskusi diplomatik mengenai janji pelaksanaan adalah satu hasil positif dari Konferensi Cancun. IPCC telah meminta pengurangan emisi untuk membatasi kenaikan suhu global sebesar 2 derajat Celcius (3,6 derajat Fahrenheit). Meskipun para pemimpin di Kopenhagen dan Cancun menggunakan jumlah yang sama untuk menentukan janji mitigasi mereka, pertumbuhan emisi saat ini, tidak ada tindakan signifikan terhadap perubahan iklim, akan menyebabkan suhu global rata-rata 5 derajat Celcius (9 derajat Fahrenheit), menurut yang terbaru. Analisis yang dihasilkan oleh Climate Interactive Scoreboard. Instrumen kebijakan dan peraturan utama untuk mengendalikan emisi gas rumah kaca ada di tingkat nasional, dan kinerjanya bervariasi dari satu negara ke negara lain. Pada tingkat internasional, Protokol Kyoto menyediakan tiga mekanisme yang dapat membantu negara-negara mengendalikan emisi mereka melalui pengaturan yang fleksibel. Mekanisme Pembangunan Bersih (Clean Development Mechanism - CDM) memungkinkan negara-negara industri untuk berinvestasi dalam proyek ramah lingkungan di negara-negara miskin dan mendapatkan kredit karbon sebagai gantinya. Mekanisme Joint Implementation (JI) memungkinkan negara-negara industri untuk berinvestasi dalam proyek ramah iklim di negara-negara industri lainnya dan mendapatkan kredit karbon sebagai gantinya. Terakhir, perdagangan emisi menciptakan pasar untuk perdagangan kredit karbon dengan negara-negara yang melebihi target mereka. Sejak awal, yang paling menjanjikan dari ketiganya adalah CDM, yang memberikan manfaat ganda untuk membatasi emisi dan memfasilitasi pembangunan ekonomi untuk negara-negara non-Annex I. Namun, para ahli telah menunjukkan kekurangan dalam operasi dan ketidakmampuannya untuk memberikan emisi yang lebih rendah dengan biaya yang dapat diterima. Secara khusus, CDM dibebani dengan keterikatan birokrasi yang luas yang telah menunda pendaftaran aktual dari banyak proyek yang telah disetujui sebelumnya. Yang lebih serius lagi, para kritikus menyalahkan CDM karena mendapatkan beberapa tim dari kredit karbon untuk perubahan biaya rendah, mencatat bahwa peraturan nasional atau cara lain untuk mendanai pengurangan emisi mungkin merupakan alternatif yang lebih baik. Selain itu, beberapa ahli mengeluh tentang China yang menangkap sejumlah besar kredit karbon, yang dikenal dengan Certified Emission Reductions (CERs), dengan mengorbankan negara-negara berkembang lainnya. Namun, partisipasi luas Chinas juga dapat membantu memulai sektor terbarunya, yang dapat memberikan manfaat jangka panjang tambahan. Meskipun COP-17 tidak menyelesaikan semua masalah ini, namun hal tersebut memperluas CDM untuk memasukkan tangkapan proyek penyimpanan tangkapan karbon yang menikmati dukungan sektor swasta yang signifikan. Perdagangan emisi, yang paling berkembang dalam kerangka kerja EU, juga menghadapi rentetan kritik. Pasar karbon masih dalam tahap awal dan penuh dengan tantangan terkait penemuan toprice. Volatilitas harga. Dan paparan risiko politik. Pada tahap ini, beberapa bisnis berpendapat bahwa harga karbon terlalu rendah untuk mendukung peluang yang menguntungkan. Demikian pula, aktivis lingkungan PDF berpendapat bahwa pasar modal terlalu tidak diatur dan tidak stabil untuk dijadikan landasan bagi upaya global melawan perubahan iklim. Meskipun nilai pasar karbon Europes mendekati perkiraan 120 miliar pada tahun 2010, kekhawatiran tentang masa depan pasar karbon global tidak ada dalam kesepakatan emisi yang mengikat secara hukum. G20 telah menekankan pentingnya mekanisme pasar untuk memerangi pemanasan global, dan beberapa berpendapat bahwa pasar karbon dapat dilihat sebagai cara murah dan sederhana untuk memastikan pengurangan emisi. Ketika diperkuat oleh peraturan, seperti sistem cap-and-trade wajib di Eropa, perdagangan emisi dapat menjadi mekanisme PDF yang bermanfaat yang berkontribusi terhadap pengurangan emisi secara keseluruhan. Pasar karbon Uni Eropa, misalnya, memiliki nilai estimasi 120 miliar. Serupa dengan model UE, sembilan negara bagian di Atlantik tengah dan timur laut Amerika Serikat telah menciptakan kerangka kerja wajib berbasis pasar, yang disebut Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), untuk mengurangi emisi. Sampai saat ini, ini adalah salah satu prakarsa pengurangan emisi yang paling menjanjikan di Amerika Serikat. Di luar rezim Kyoto, upaya internasional untuk mengurangi emisi karbon dioksida telah menghasilkan sebuah program PBB untuk Mengurangi Emisi dari Deforestasi dan Degradasi (UN-REDD). Program ini memberikan insentif keuangan bagi negara-negara miskin untuk melindungi hutan nasional mereka dan dengan demikian memberikan mereka beberapa tanggung jawab untuk pengurangan emisi global. Dengan beberapa perkiraan, penggundulan hutan tropis menyumbang 15 persen PDF emisi karbon dioksida tahunan global. Protokol Kyoto, bagaimanapun, tidak memiliki mekanisme untuk konservasi atau pencegahan deforestasi sebagai sarana untuk mengurangi perubahan iklim. Berdasarkan protokol tersebut, negara-negara dapat mencari kredit dan dukungan finansial setelah hutan ditebang namun tidak ada dukungan yang tersedia untuk mencegah mereka mengurangi penebangan hutan. Untungnya, aktivisme dalam masalah ini telah menghasilkan cukup banyak kepentingan bagi negara-negara industri untuk berkomitmen 3,5 miliar untuk menyediakan dana untuk kegiatan deforestasi. Demikian pula, COP-17 membentuk kerangka kerja teknis untuk memfasilitasi produk deforestasi. Selanjutnya, pada bulan Februari 2012, Amerika Serikat, bersama dengan Kanada, Meksiko, Swedia, Ghana, dan Bangladesh, meluncurkan usaha bersama untuk mengurangi polutan iklim berumur pendek. Polutan hanya tinggal di atmosfer sebentar, namun jumlahnya mencapai sekitar 30 persen. Dari pemanasan global seperti karbon hitam, hidrofluorokarbon, dan metana. Dana terbatas sebesar 15 juta dana disiapkan untuk mendukung usaha kelompok tersebut, namun penghasil emisi berat seperti China dan India tidak mendaftar. Memantau dan memberlakukan pembatasan emisi: Memantau tambalan tapi memperbaiki, penegakan tidak ada Transparansi dalam pemotongan emisi telah menjadi fokus yang relatif baru dari rezim perubahan iklim. Rencana Aksi Bali mengadopsi parameter pemantauan baru yang mewajibkan negara maju dan negara berkembang untuk melakukan tindakan mitigasi yang dapat diukur, dilaporkan, dan diverifikasi (MRV). Diperkuat di Kopenhagen, agenda ini dilanjutkan di Cancun, di mana dokumen terakhir meminta penilaian emisi dan penghapusan internasional terkait dengan target pengurangan emisi ekonomi yang terukur secara keseluruhan untuk negara maju secara transparan. Namun, bahasa penegakan ini harus disesuaikan dengan rencana pelaksanaan, yang kemungkinan akan menjadikannya isu yang diperdebatkan untuk kesepakatan iklim internasional di masa depan. Platform Durban 2011 mungkin telah menciptakan kebingungan tambahan mengenai penerapan kesepakatan iklim. Terutama ambigu adalah seruannya untuk sebuah kesepakatan baru dengan kekuatan hukum untuk menggantikan Protokol Kyoto dan bukan satu yang secara tegas mengikat secara hukum. Berdasarkan kerangka UNFCCC saat ini, negara-negara maju melaporkan emisi mereka setiap tahunnya dan negara-negara berkembang seharusnya melaporkannya setiap enam tahun. Persediaan emisi di negara maju pada umumnya disepakati menjadi kuat, dan diterima sebagai basis perdagangan emisi internasional (di mana kesalahan dalam akuntansi emisi akan menghasilkan transfer keuangan yang besar). Pelaporan dari negara-negara berkembang secara luas dianggap jauh lebih lemah, dan persyaratan pelaporan enam tahun sering dilanggar. Pengecualiannya adalah proyek CDM, yang dipantau secara hati-hati untuk menentukan apakah pengurangan emisi yang dijanjikan benar-benar tercapai di sini, pemantauan secara luas disetujui untuk menjadi kuat. Dalam upaya untuk meningkatkan pemantauan, pada tahun 2009 UNFCCC menghasilkan sebuah proses penjaminan dan review baru. Proses ini mengarahkan negara-negara untuk menerbitkan tujuan pengurangan emisi sesuai dengan kemampuan nasional mereka dan kemudian tunduk pada pemantauan internasional berdasarkan Copenhagen Accord. Hambatan untuk meningkatkan pemantauan emisi di negara-negara berkembang adalah tiga kali lipat. Pertama, banyak negara tersebut kekurangan kapasitas dalam negeri untuk memantau emisi mereka sendiri, yang membuat pemantauan internasional menjadi lebih sulit. Perkiraan emisi yang ada umumnya merupakan ekstrapolasi berdasarkan penggunaan energi, dan bahkan negara-negara berkembang besar seperti China dan India, misalnya, tidak mengetahui output total emisi mereka. Ketidakpastian ini diperburuk di negara-negara dengan emisi yang signifikan dari deforestasi karena sarana teknis untuk mengukur secara tepat emisi tersebut belum ada. Kedua, bahkan jika negara-negara berkembang dapat memantau emisinya, banyak yang mewaspadai bahwa emisi pelaporan akan membuka mereka untuk menekan emisi tersebut yang telah mereka tahan dengan kuat. Ketiga, negara-negara seperti China secara terbuka menyatakan bahwa konsesi untuk sistem pemantauan yang dapat diverifikasi secara internasional merupakan pelanggaran langsung terhadap kedaulatan nasional mereka. Kendati ada hambatan ini, kesepakatan yang berfokus pada pemantauan emisi mungkin lebih mudah dilakukan daripada pengaturan berdasarkan pengurangan emisi yang mengikat. Penegakan, sementara itu, pada dasarnya tidak ada. Negara-negara yang gagal memenuhi target Kyoto mereka secara hukum diminta untuk mengurangi kekurangan tersebut (ditambah hukuman 30 persen) dari total emisi yang diizinkan pada fase protokol berikutnya. Namun dalam praktiknya, ini tidak ada artinya, mengingat bahwa emisi yang diizinkan di masa depan belum dinegosiasikan. Jika aturan hukuman Protokol Kyoto diamati, masih ada di negara-negara yang mengajukan pertanyaan hanya bisa menegosiasikan kenaikan baru yang meningkat dengan jumlah yang mengimbangi denda atau secara resmi mundur dari kesepakatan seperti yang dilakukan Kanada pada tahun 2011. Pemotongan emisi pembiayaan: Membutuhkan opsi konkret Menyalurkan dana untuk mengekang Emisi dan adaptasi terhadap pemanasan global merupakan salah satu tantangan terberat dalam perang melawan perubahan iklim. Dana Iklim Hijau, yang ditetapkan di Cancun menjadi pusat terpusat untuk pembiayaan iklim, baru-baru ini disepakati pada bulan Oktober 2011 mengenai rancangan rencana untuk mendispersikan dana. Sementara COP-17 membuat kemajuan dalam mengklarifikasi struktur tata kelola Green Climate Fund, hanya 50 juta yang dijanjikan sebagai dana bibit. Dan, terlepas dari negara-negara Annex I yang telah menunjukkan kepemimpinan penting COP-16 ke konvensi iklim PBB dengan berkomitmen untuk memfasilitasi pendanaan swasta dan memberikan bantuan tahunan sebesar 100 miliar per tahun pada 2020 dan menegaskan kembali komitmen mereka untuk melakukannya di COP-18. Meskipun demikian, terlepas dari adanya komitmen ini, tidak ada kerangka kerja yang disepakati untuk pembiayaan dalam dokumen hasil akhir. Lebih jauh lagi, beberapa kritikus berpendapat bahwa 100 miliar dana bantuan harus menjadi figur dasar, karena tidak sesuai dengan kebutuhan negara berkembang. Yang diproyeksikan akan meningkatkan PDF menjadi 300 miliar per tahun pada tahun 2020. Total komitmen untuk mencapai 30 miliar dana jangka pendek yang dijanjikan untuk tahun 2012 hampir mencapai jumlah target, namun laporan menunjukkan bahwa sedikit dari ini mewakili uang di luar bantuan yang ada sebelumnya. Paket PDF Pada bulan Februari 2010, Sekretaris Jenderal PBB Ban Ki-moon membentuk Kelompok Penasehat Pembiayaan Perubahan Tingkat Tinggi untuk mengeksplorasi cara-cara untuk mencapai janji pendanaan Kopenhagen. Laporan akhir kelompok tersebut dirilis pada bulan November 2010 dan meminta pajak atas emisi, perdagangan, dan perjalanan internasional. Sementara tanggapan kebijakan yang nyata mengenai laporan tersebut sebagian besar tidak bersemangat di Amerika Serikat, Uni Eropa telah menerapkan pajak emisi kontroversial pada maskapai yang terbang masuk dan keluar dari wilayah EU-nya, yang mulai berlaku pada Januari 2012. Baru-baru ini, Badan Energi Internasional (International Energy Agency) IEA) melaporkan bahwa pencapaian tujuan iklim pada tahun 2020 akan membutuhkan investasi sekitar 5 triliun. Situasi menjadi sangat menjengkelkan ketika transfer uang dari negara-negara industri ke negara berkembang ikut bermain. Pada pertemuan G20 bulan September 2009 di Pittsburgh, para pemimpin mengusulkan kenaikan dana yang signifikan ke negara-negara miskin, namun perbedaan bagaimana mencapai tujuan ini menyebabkan pernyataan PDF yang lemah yang hanya mengakui kebutuhan akan pembiayaan perubahan iklim (yang karenanya tidak ada tindak lanjut Melalui pertemuan puncak G20 Toronto pada bulan Juni 2010). Janji baru-baru ini yang dibuat pada konferensi iklim PBB di Cancun adalah kekurangan aspirasi beberapa pemimpin dunia dan tidak memiliki rincian mengenai sumber dan pencairannya. Saat ini, beberapa pembiayaan perubahan iklim PDF datang dengan cara bantuan pembangunan resmi (ODA). Beberapa dana multilateral telah didirikan di bawah UNFCCC. Bank Dunia. Dan GEF untuk memberikan hibah dan pinjaman yang menargetkan aspek spesifik dari perubahan iklim, mulai dari adaptasi hingga pengembangan teknologi bersih. Namun, pada umumnya dana ini bersifat sukarela dan memiliki perbedaan yang terbatas. Banyak ahli menunjuk investasi swasta sebagai jalan ke depan. Investasi swasta sangat penting di negara-negara industri namun jauh lebih sulit didapat di negara-negara berkembang. Mekanisme pembangunan bersih (CDM) yang awalnya dibuat oleh Protokol Kyoto telah mendapat tepuk tangan untuk menyuntikkan dana sektor swasta untuk proyek energi bersih ke negara-negara berkembang dan membantu negara-negara industri memenuhi target pemotongan emisi mereka. Namun, CDM telah membawa sedikit manfaat bagi daerah yang paling membutuhkan energi bersih, terutama sub-Sahara Afrika. Beberapa ekonom dan pembuat kebijakan telah mengusulkan solusi inovatif untuk defisit pembiayaan seperti pajak Tobin atas transaksi keuangan atau pajak karbon untuk transportasi udara (Uni Eropa menetapkan yang terakhir pada tahun 2012). Organisasi untuk Kerjasama Ekonomi dan Pembangunan (OECD) telah melaporkan PDF bahwa jika semua negara industri menggunakan pajak karbon atau izin emisi perdagangan yang dilelang untuk mengurangi emisi mereka sebesar 20 persen pada tahun 2020 dibandingkan dengan tingkat tahun 1990, pendapatan fiskal dapat mencapai 2,5 persen dari PDB oleh 2020. Pemanfaatan carbon sinks: Pencapaian dalam deforestasi Sekitar seperlima emisi global berasal dari penggunaan lahan, termasuk deforestasi. Mitigating the effects of climate change will require looking at a broad set of alternatives, including leveraging tools inherent to our natural ecosystem. Forests provide natural carbon sinks that help mitigate the effects of carbon dioxide emissions. There are currently few initiatives that compensate countries that promote this natural process. Through the CDM, the UNFCCC regime provides carbon credits for afforestation and reforestation projects. Although this is a positive step, critically missing are incentives for forest conservation activities that would help reduce emissions from existing carbon stocks. In an effort to bridge this gap, numerous PDF bilateral and multilateral arrangements outside the UNFCCC framework have been created to provide assistance to developing countries in harnessing their carbon sinks. Negotiations at the fifteenth meeting of states party to the UN climate convention, for instance, secured a pledge for 3.5 billion to combat deforestation in developing countries, which complements an existing UN-REDD program funded by Norway, Denmark, and Spain. Additionally, the World Bank Forest Carbon Partnership Facility provides better forestry management and conservation. At the national level, some governments have established funds, such as Brazils Amazon Fund. and Burkina Fasos cash bonus tree-planting program, which leverage private donations and government resources to provide incentives for the preservation of forests. Additionally, there has been some attention on promoting oceans as a natural carbon sink. However, scientific skepticism on the oceans ability to absorb carbon dioxide emissions remains. Promoting low-carbon development: Needs coherence, financial support, and developing-country buy-in Low-carbon development must be at the heart of any successful climate change mitigation effort. Yet it faces two distinct challenges. The world is not particularly good at development assistance beyond climate change, and it has no large-scale experience with low-carbon development. The Kyoto Protocol focused on promoting low-carbon development through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Although the CDM has undoubtedly resulted in some low-carbon investment that would not have otherwise occurred, it has not prompted fundamental shifts in development patterns. Alongside it, traditional development organizations have begun to invest in low-carbon development. The World Bank. for example, has ramped up climate-related spending, and the UNEP has set climate change as a priority in its capacity-building efforts. These efforts are constrained, however, by funding that is not commensurate with the scale of the challenge, as well as by deeper challenges in the development aid model. These international institutions are also not well coordinated, with occasionally weak mechanisms that can fail to complement each other. Another important path to low-carbon development is new technology, such as carbon capture and storage (CCS), which focuses on securing and storing carbon dioxide emissions before they are released into the atmosphere. Although this technology is still in its early stages, successful pilot projects offer hope of developing and implementing it for large-scale projects. Some countries are committed to implementing variations of it, and both bilateral and multilateral cooperation is under way. This cooperation is particularly important because implementing CCS on a large scale can be expensive and offers few obvious economic benefits. One of the major multilateral efforts in this area is the Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum (CSLF), which supports joint efforts to develop cost-effective carbon sequestration technology. At the bilateral level, the EU-China Partnership on Climate Change helps to develop Near-Zero Emissions Coal (NZEC) plants in China using CCS technology. The United States and China have also recently agreed to develop joint projects using CCS technology. Additionally, an international initiative, Futuregen. led by the U. S. Department of Energy, harnesses public and private-sector funds and expertise to help build near-zero emissions plants around the world. Renewable and nuclear energy will be critical in diminishing reliance on fossil fuels and developing low-carbon communities. Expectations for nuclear power as an alternative source of energy are especially high among big emitters such as India, China, and the United States, as well as in a number of developing countries that lack the necessary infrastructure to meet their growing energy needs. Since the nuclear incident in the wake of Japans March 2011 earthquake and tsunami, some of the support for nuclear power has declined. Currently, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) assists countries in determining whether nuclear energy is a feasible option. When nuclear energy is optimal, the agency assists with energy planning and developing relevant infrastructure, such as drafting nuclear legislation and establishing independent and effective safety regulators. However, given its limited resources, the IAEA will find it increasingly difficult to meet the growing demands for its services as more developing countries seek help in establishing nuclear facilities. There has also been significant international action on renewable energy. The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), founded in January 2009, is the first international forum for specifically promoting the use of renewable energy. The UNEP has launched several initiatives, including the Global Bioenergy Partnership (GBEP), to support the deployment of biomass and biofuels, and the Solar and Wind Energy Resource Assessment (SWERA), which seeks to make renewable energy data widely available. Despite these promising international efforts, only about 25 percent PDF of the worlds energy is produced through renewable and alternative sources (including hydroelectric, biomass, and nuclear). However, investment in these areas continues to increase PDF (rising seventeen percent to a total of 257 billion in 2011) and more and more countries are setting policy targets for using renewable energy. Another dimension of the solution is often ignored but is likely, in the long term, to be the most prominent: domestic policy reform in developing countries that encourages low-carbon investment. This might include steps like energy market reform or reduction of tariff barriers to low-carbon technology transfer. International institutions have begun to promote domestic policy shifts through measures like technical assistance provided by organizations like the UNEP and UNDP. discussions PDF on tariff reductions for environmentally friendly technologies through the WTO, and processes aimed at phasing out fossil fuel subsidies spurred through the G20. Some existing institutions, though, may incidentally work against positive developments in this area. The Kyoto Protocols CDM, for example, may discourage countries from making climate-friendly policy changes by rewarding countries only for activities that go beyond existing national policy. Complicating matters, efforts to promote policy shifts and efforts aimed at providing assistance with clean development are rarely coordinated with each other. Adapting to climate change: Addressed weakly and incidentally Adapting to climate change is currently being addressed incidentally through traditional development aid. Organizations like the World Bank and USAID are working to climate-proof their investments. Moreover, most traditional development aid (often aimed at areas like health and agriculture) will help countries become more resilient in a changing climate. Yet the perennial shortfalls in development assistanceboth financially and in having the desired policy impactmean that adaptation assistance invariably falls short as well. There have been targeted efforts to address adaptation in particular. The Kyoto Protocols Adaptation Fund. supported by a small tax on CDM credit sales, currently yields funds that are supposed to be spent on adaptation. The fund, however, is severely underfinanced and hobbled by its own bureaucratic governance. The GEF also administers several funds that target adaptation efforts. The Least Developed Countries Climate Fund (LDCF) and the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) aim to address long-term efforts for the most vulnerable developing countries. Additionally, the World Bank Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR) works to integrate adaptation measures into development aid. National Adaptation Programs of Action under PPCR are underway in eighteen countries in the Caribbean, the Pacific, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. While the World Bank facilitates this and other Climate Investment Funds, it has also provided loans for coal power plants and other projects not friendly to the climate change agenda. Most of these efforts are not distinguishable from other development support, however, making it difficult for a separate adaptation fund to make a big difference in any case. The sixteenth Conference of Parties in Cancun developed a Cancun Adapation Framework (CAF) to raise the prominence of adaptation measures in the UNFCCCs efforts. The CAF also represented the first formal agreement to establish guidelines concerning capacity building in communities vulnerable to the effects of cliamte change. Adaptation financing, even after the COP-17 in Durban remains an ad hoc enterprise. Adaptation efforts are also hurt by the failure of the international community to generate precise predictions on the effects of climate change. The IPCC focuses on long-term projections and on regional or global analyses. Organizations like the UNDP help countries use broader projections in national adaptation planning, and national governments sometimes assist others in such efforts. Whether having governments and international institutions handle these projections offers any benefits is, however, still unclear. U. S. Climate Change Policy Issues The United States and the international community face a host of challenges on the domestic and international fronts in the attempt to build a more robust international climate regime. At home, progress has come to a virtual standstill after the failure of national cap-and-trade legislation. Abroad, the ultimate fate of the Kyoto Protocol looms large. The United States will need to decide whether to rely on state-by-state targets, participate in minilateral forums, or engage in multilateral negotiations for reducing emissions, among other questions. It must also decide whether it intends to pursue a legally binding climate agreement. Other policy issues straddle the domestic-international divide. Should the international community pursue a legally binding treaty to replace the Kyoto Protocol Yes . Proponents of legally binding commitments, like the Kyoto Protocol, argue that they are the only way to guarantee that countries will cut their emissions. Proponents also argue that by ensuring that others meet their obligations, legally binding commitments help promote stronger action by all parties. Moreover, they note that in some cases, legal commitments are needed to serve as the basis for schemes involving large financial flows, such as carbon trading. They also point to the heritage of the Kyoto Protocol, which included legally binding commitments for developed countries, and argue that it would be a step backward to take a different route in the future. Moreover, withdrawing from efforts toward a binding accord would likely signal a retreat from the Durban Platform agreed to by 194 state parties in December 2011. Specifically, the COP-17 outcome document calls on states to develop a successor to the Kyoto Protocol with legal force by 2020. No . On the other hand, detractors of the Kyoto Protocol claim the emissions reduction model inherent to the accord is not tenable, and the outcome of the COP-17 meeting in Durban may prove the international community is trying to move away from using legally binding emissions targets. Objections to including legally binding commitments at the center of an international climate deal take at least four forms. Some argue that enforcing climate commitments is extremely difficult and that, as a result, the legal nature of commitments may not be meaningful. Thus, they counsel against investing the extra effort normally required to devise a legally binding arrangement. Others argue that because climate commitments may turn out to be difficult or impossible, they should not be made legally binding, thus avoiding the risk of noncompliance. A frequent counterpart to this argument is the claim that because countries are concerned about noncompliance, they will tend to focus on making weak commitments in the first place freeing them from concerns about being legally bound might also free them to do more. While some accept the prospect of legally binding commitments for Annex-I countries like the United States in principle, they argue that all major economies or all countries should make similar commitments. If those same analysts also believe that major developing countries will not make legally binding commitmentsa widely shared viewthen they conclude that major greenhouse gas emitters like the United States should not make such commitments either. Canadas December 2011 decision to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol reflects this line of thinking. Should the United States focus its resources on minilateral forums rather than the UN climate framework Yes . Some say that progress on global climate change requires a joint strategy among the small number of actors responsible for the lions share of the worlds carbon dioxide emissions, including China (25.3 percent), the United States (17.8 percent), the European Union (14.2 percent), and a handful of other developed and emerging economies. The United States and other major economies have already begun to turn to smaller, less formal frameworks, including the Group of Twenty (G20), the Major Economies Forum (MEF), and the Climate Change Forumwhich some analysts point to as alternatives to the United Nations. These arenas allow large emitters to confront tricky issues and hammer out viable strategies without having to engage all 193 members of the United Nations. If the United States focuses its attention on minilateral forums with important players, it may achieve meaningful emissions control targets, as well as financial commitments for mitigation and technological development. Moreover, the United States can use the MEF and similar minilateral forums to complement the UNFCC process by negotiating realistic multilateral agreements that can subsequently be legitimated at the UN level. No . Others argue that the breadth of its membership and depth of its history makes the UN climate framework the bedrock of the international climate regime. Climate change is a global threat that requires input from the worlds most vulnerable nationsnot just the worlds largest emitters. Experience suggests that major emitting nations may use minilateral forums not to drive concrete action but to avoid binding emissions reductions and other sacrifices to address climate change. By focusing on minilateral forums. the United States diverts its limited resources from the UN climate negotiations, which are the most legitimate basis for global action. Any climate negotiations that exclude the majority of the worlds countries would be difficult to implement and inherently flawed. Still, others note that focusing on the minilateral versus broader UN forums may obscure focus on adequate levels of political will to address climate change. Should the United States focus on state-by-state targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions Yes . Proponents of this idea note that climate change action at the federal level is no longer a politically feasible goal within the United States. Efforts to enact cap-and-trade systems in the United States, such as the McCain-Lieberman and Lieberman-Warner legislation, have failed. The House ultimately passed the Waxman-Markey bill in June 2009, which would have capped greenhouse emissions at 17 percent of 2005 levels and provided increased investment for clean energy technology, but the U. S. Senate failed to agree on a matching cap-and-trade bill. Furthermore, even relatively minor climate change mitigation regulations have faced bipartisan resistance, with issues like cap-and-trade and a carbon tax basically disappearing from political debate. In October 2011, the Housepassed a measure through a bipartisan voice vote, which would order U. S. airliners to not pay fees associated with a new EU emissions tax on air travel scheduled to take effect in January 2012. The nine-state Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) and the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) also provide evidence that the fifty states are capable of crafting their own climate change plans moulded to the particularities of their geography, resources, and region. The WCI, launched in 2007 by six U. S. states and four Canadian provinces along the western rim of North America, illustrates an effort to tackle climate change at the regional level. According to its design, the WCI forms working committees, which recommend policies aimed at collectively reducing greenhouse gas emissions among member states and provinces. Relying on a cap-and-trade system, WCI members aim to reduce regional greenhouse gas emissions by 15 percent from 2005 levels by 2020. No . Opponents argue that the rest of the world is looking to the United States to act on climate change, and that pursuing national level reformeven if during the global financial crisiscould give the United States credibility and leverage in this area. Since the failure of cap-and-trade, no significant climate change legislation has passed the House or Senate, calling U. S. global leadership in this area into question. Many climate change analysts also point to criticism regarding the inaction of the United States during the COP-17 as evidence that the climate change issue may be negatively affecting perceptions of U. S. global leadership. Furthermore, some would also suggest that the December 2011 decision by Canada to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol has placed the entire global climate change regime in jeopardy. Opponents of a state-by-state strategy also point to New Jerseys decision in 2011 to unilaterally pull out of the RGGI and Arizonas move in 2010 to leave the Western Climate Initiative as evidence that a state-by-state approach to reducing emissions in the United States is too risky of a strategy to rely on. In short, a top-down approach, rather than bottom-up alternatives, is likely to be more effective, and more enforceable . Finally, those calling for a national level reprioritization of the issue of climate change in the United States point to the recent passage of carbon tax legislation in another Annex 1 country, Australia, as evidence to support their position. Should international carbon trading be a central part of U. S. climate change strategy Yes . Proponents of using international carbon trading argue that it lowers PDF compliance costs for U. S. companies by allowing them to buy cheap emissions-reduction credits from abroad in lieu of cutting their own emissions. In addition, trading based on either project-based offsets or broader schemes with relatively high baselines could also channel large amounts of money to developing countries. Many believe that such transfers are the only way to induce deep cuts in developing countries emissions. Some also make a political argument for trading: integrating countries emissions-cutting programs into a global market would make it more difficult for any country to back away from its obligations. Supporters of international carbon trading differ on the forms of trading they support. Some support all optionsproject-based offsets. program-based offsets. sectoral trading. and economy-wide trading. Others support only certain variations, most commonly ones with wider scope such as sectoral or economy-wide options. No . Opponents of international carbon trading make a variety of arguments. Some object to any efforts to transfer significant sums of money to developing countries, and hence oppose carbon trading. Others support such efforts but argue that they could often be done more effectively through large public funds rather than through carbon markets. Some support carbon trading in principle, but object on the basis that many such systems are unworkable in practice. They point to the experience of the CDM, a part of the Kyoto Protocol that allows developed countries to pay for emissions-cutting projects in developing countries in lieu of reducing their emissions. The CDM has been widely criticized as inefficient and as including many projects that would have occurred anyhow. Some who criticize it believe that its problems can be fixed by moving to other schemes for carbon trading others disagree. A final group opposes international carbon trading on ethical grounds, arguing that developed countries have a moral obligation to reduce their emissions and that avoiding that obligation by paying others is wrong. Should the world agree to country-by-country targets for cutting greenhouse gas emissions Yes . Agreeing on country-by-country targets has become the primary goal of recent climate change negotiations. Proponents of assigning greenhouse gas emissions targets to all countries maintain that they are needed to ensure that aggregate global emissions do not exceed dangerous thresholds. They take their cue from the Kyoto Protocol and its recent extension until 2017 or 2020, which focuses on a targets and timetables approach for developed countries. Some experts argue that it would be helpful to develop emissions-reduction goals for major emitters by setting short-term timetables and by targeting specific sectors. Limiting emissions intensity based on the production process instead of setting absolute targets could also prove beneficial. Beyond these points, many note that country-by-country targets are essential to enabling full-blown global carbon trading schemes (which could reduce the cost of cutting global emissions) and argue that it is only fair for all countries to adopt targets if some do so. No . Following the failure of the Copenhagen Accord, as well as a lack of agreement on a new legally binding emisssions treaty at the COP-17, some argue that it may be impossible to garner international consensus on country-specific emissions cuts. Capacity and verification also remain issues in developing countries, making it difficult to implement policies that control ultimate emissions (such as cap-and-trade systems). Others support global emissions cutsoften stronglybut argue that adopting targets is not necessary to achieving that end. They contend that international discussions should be focused on suites of emissions-cutting policies and measures (policy inputs) rather than on emissions (policy outcomes). Should trade sanctions be used to enforce climate change rules Yes . Climate change agreements are notoriously weak on enforcement. The Kyoto Protocol technically included penalties for noncompliance in practice, though, those penalties have not been enforced. Some have turned to trade sanctions as an enforcement tool, arguing that border adjustment tariffs are the appropriate sanction for noncompliance. These would, ostensibly, impose costs on imports from countries with weak climate regulation equal to the costs those countries avoid through lax regulation. Some also argue that implementing a cap-and-trade system in the United States would politically require border adjustment provisions to compensate for productivity losses stemming from rising energy costs. Domestic legislation taking this factor into account passed in the House, but failed to get through the Senate. It is yet to be seen, however, how to implement these provisions without violating rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Others argue such a system would be too weak to prompt appropriate behavior, and push for more punitive sanctions. Proponents of using sanctions for enforcement are also split over whether such sanctions must be part of an international agreement or might be imposed unilaterally. Those in the first school argue that internationally approved sanctions are more credible as a threat and less likely to disrupt the broader global trading system. They also contend that unilateral sanctions would be too weak. Those in the latter camp doubt that appropriate sanctions could be built into an international agreement and think that sanctions are worth pursuing unilaterally . No . Opponents of using sanctions argue that they are ineffective and that they could create problems for broader trade and climate efforts. They assert that border adjustment tariffs would target only a limited part of a countrys economy (energy-intensive exports) and would impose a penalty smaller than the value of noncompliance. Regardless of their efficacy, many object to unilateral sanctions on legal grounds. They argue that punitive sanctions would violate global trade rules. More controversially, some also argue that border adjustment tariffs, done unilaterally, would violate WTO rules. Either of these options, they contend, would not only cause harm to global trade, but also poison the political environment for international climate negotiations and cooperation. Most agree, though, that multilateral sanctions, if made part of an international climate agreement, could be designed to withstand WTO scrutiny. Recent Developments December 2013: GCF opens in Korea In December 2013, the Green Climate Fund (GCF) opened its headquarters in Songdo, South Korea. The GCF was originally established as a result of the C0P-16 negotiations in Cancun, Mexico. It is designed to manage annual commitments that will escalate to a combined 100 billion by 2020 for adaptation. Developed countries have pledged to provide this assistance to developing countries to help them adapt to the impacts of climate change and achieve their own emissions reduction targets. Though the opening of a physical headquarters was a welcome first step, it remained difficult to determine whether contributions to date by developed countries were genuinely additional allocations to this effort, or simply reapportionment of previously allocated financial resources. November 2013: COP-19 in Warsaw In November 2013, the nineteenth session of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change convened in Warsaw, Poland. Longstanding disagreements between industrialized and developing countries continued to obstruct efforts to reach consensus on international emissions reduction targets. Still, the establishment of the Warsaw Mechanism for Loss and Damage was a sign of progress. This mechanism may mobilize support for overcoming these disagreements between industrialized and developing countries by providing a substantive means for the former to render assistance to the latter for adaptation to the impacts of climate change. This momentum could prove critical to realizing the full potential of the 2014 COP in Lima, Peru and ultimately the 2015 COP in Paris, France. September 2013: IPCCC publishes carbon budget In September 2013, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) released a draft of its working group report that will ultimately be released as part of the IPCC 5th Assessment Report. The report articulated a target threshold of one million metric tons for the planets human population in order to impede global warming in excess of 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit from a preindustrial baseline. If warming exceeds that temperature, the panel warned of perilous consequences across the entirety of the climate system. Remarkably, the IPCC estimates the remainder of this carbon budget will be completely expended by the year 2045. Indeed, the National Ocean and Atmospheric Administration of the United States earlier the same year logged measurements that indicated atmospheric carbon dioxide had reached an average daily level in excess of 400 parts per milliona level of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere that is not believed to have been reached in the preceding three million years. May 2013: Human causes of climate change A survey has found that 97 percent of scientific studies on climate change conclude human activity, due to the consumption of fossil fuels, is causing global warming. The survey, published in Environmental Research Letters, examined the work of nearly 12,000 peer-reviewed research papers published over the last two decades. Of these, over 4,000 papers took a position on the causes of climate change, of which 0.7 percent disputed the consensus of anthropogenic-induced warming. A further 2.2 percent argued that the science is unclear one way or another. Our findings prove that there is a strong scientific agreement about the cause of climate change, says survey director John Cook, despite public perceptions to the contrary. Indeed, a public opinion survey conducted by the Pew Research Center in October 2012 reported that only 45 percent of Americans held the belief that scientists agree Earth is getting warmer because of human activity. April 2013: China to cut HCFCs The Multilateral Fund of the Montreal Protocol struck an agreement with the Chinese government on the elimination of the industrial production of ozone-depleting substances (ODS). In exchange for 385 million over a seventeen-year period, China committed to retiring all production capacity of hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) by 2030. Beijing also agreed to retire any surplus capacity of HCFCs that is not currently in use. China is the worlds largest producer and consumer of HCFCs. Since ratification of the Montreal Protocol in 1987, state parties have eliminated ninety-seven percent of ODS, and HCFCs represent one of the last remaining sources of ozone pollution that the Protocol aims to curb. April 2013: California-Canadian initiative On April 22, the State of California officially linked its cap-and-trade program with a similar scheme in Quebec province. Established in 2006 under a landmark global warming law (AB 32), Californias program places a price on carbon emissions and allows companies to buy and sell carbon credits issued at state auctions. Under the merger. which formally begins on January 1, 2014, California businesses will be able to use Quebecs permits and Californias permits will be valid in Quebec. Options for Strengthening the Climate Change Regime The multi-faceted threats posed by climate change demand policies that address both mitigation and adaptation. Operationally, this will require a variety of flexible partnerships among national, bilateral, and multilateral actors, and a combination of short-term and long-term strategies. These recommendations reflect the views of Stewart M. Patrick. director of the program on international institutions and global governance. While the Durban Platform. approved by nearly two hundred countries in December 2011, may have provided a small window of breathing room concerning the development of a successor accord to the Kyoto Protocol, much work remains to be done. In moving towards a postKyoto agreement due to come into force in 2020, the international community should remain cognizant of certain trends that emerged during and immediately after the COP-17. This, for one, includes acknowledging growing cracks among countries in the developing world regarding accepting binding emissions targetsan issue of critical concern to small island developing states in the Pacific and other areas. These fissures should be explored as much as possible to both create a global consensus regarding the creation of major greenhouse gas emissions targets and to isolate intransigent countries. Second, the global financial crisis cannot become a catch-all excuse to avoid meeting pledges for global climate change finance mechanisms like the Green Climate Fund. While the 50 million in seed money promised during the COP-17 is an excellent start, moremuch moreis needed as the environmental effects of climate change become increasingly apparent around the world. Importantly, the narrative among developed economies must change because waiting to act will be substantially more costly than action now. Third, the international community must not let its existing accomplishments on climate changesuch as the Kyoto Protocol itselffall by the wayside as it struggles to develop new alternatives for a comprehensive climate change accord. Canadas December 2011 decision to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol should be interpreted as a crystal clear warning that the agreement is increasingly at risk of unraveling. As a result, countries such as the United States, China, and India need to place a fresh emphasis on their commitments to combat climate change, including providing clear, reasonable, and practical indications as to their expectations for a post-Kyoto accord. Even though the Durban Platforms call for a 2020 accordwhich would apply both to developed and developing stateswith legal force does not necessarily imply legally binding, the time for big emitters like the United States to simply stay the course on climate change has expired. Reform, Refresh, and Renew the Clean Development Mechanism The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) has come under fire on many fronts. Some have argued that too many nonadditional projects (those that would have reduced emissions even without the CDM) have been approved others argue that the project approval process is too stringent. And others have argued that because it has no legal life beyond Kyoto, it will fail to bring about lasting results. These criticisms have on various occasions been right. Scrapping the CDM entirely is not likely to be politically feasible, especially considering the COP-17 decision to extend the Kyoto Protocol for at least another five years. Reforming the CDM will thus be necessary to ensure that money is not wasted and that large volumes of offset credits remain available. The international community should reform CDM to focus on the least developed countries and on activities that are unquestionably additional. It should focus on sector-based trading for other countries. This could allow crediting for sectors that beat aggressive preset baselines, without penalizing them for exceeding those baselines. At the same time, the UNFCCC will need to work on streamlining the CDM approval process. Ideally, the CDM bureaucracy could be substantially reduced if CDM governance were shifted more to the countries providing funds. The recent announcement of a year-long CDM reform consultation process process as well as the decision during the COP-17 in Durban to formally include carbon capture storage projects under the CDM are significant first steps. However, both must be followed by firm policy action to keep the CDM relevant and economically sustainable. Force progress in U. S. domestic climate change policy The failure to pass comprehensive U. S. climate legislation, with a sweeping carbon cap-and-trade at its base, is a significant setback to U. S. mitigation efforts. Cutting U. S. emissions remains an essential step toward a climate-change solution at home and abroad, providing not only an environmentally sound solution to the problem, but giving the United States leverage in international bargaining as well. The increasingly intractable position of the United States became more apparent during the COP-17 meeting in Durban. There, the United States faced nearly universal criticism for not showing the leadership necessary to address climate change. While a cap-and-trade system remains ideal, deep cuts in U. S. emissions can be pursued in a variety of ways, including energy-efficiency regulations, subsidies for renewable energy, and tax incentives for low-carbon technologies. Effort to reach consensus on these solutions should be pursued in the short term, keeping in mind that a broad-based and economy-wide price on carbon is essential to driving the very deep emissions cuts that will be needed through 2050 and beyond at a reasonable economic cost. Facing a divided Congress and significant pressure to reduce the federal deficit, President Obama seems to have limited options with regard to advancing an effective domestic climate change policy nonetheless the picture is far from hopeless. One way for Obama to force progress is to issue more executive orders and administrative rulemakings to partially substitute for Congressional opposition to his climate and energy agenda. Working through the EPA and the Clean Air Act, he could enact tougher rules that would cut carbon pollution from power plants and mitigate the potential effects of the failure to enact a national cap-and-trade program. An agreement reached with the auto industry in July 2011 to double fuel standards to fifty-four miles per gallon by 2025 is also a step in the right direction, provided that its stipulations are enforced. Other significant measures the administration can take include government procurement of renewable energy and energy-efficient products and services, and reductions in subsidies for fossil fuel-related research and extraction. Perhaps one of the most significant steps President Obama can take towards realizing his climate change policy is to strike a deal with China to reduce global emissions of CO2. The two nations combined account for 40 percent of the worlds carbon pollution, so a bilateral agreement could mollify Obamas opponents in Congress and encourage other nations to follow suit. In the longer term, the United States and its international partners should consider the following steps: Build a credible institution or institutions for measuring, reporting, and verifying global emissions and emissions-cutting efforts Countries will not make strong efforts to reduce emissions unless they are confident that others are playing their part. Nor will wealthier countries provide financial or technological assistance to poorer counterparts unless they are confident that the efforts they support will actually be implemented. This demands robust institutional capacity to verify that countries are making the cuts and investing in the emissions-cutting actions that they claim to be. The precise approach to this could take multiple forms. with the task falling primarily to the international level at one extreme, and domestic institutions at the other. At a minimum, an international institution will need to aggregate national-level reporting this might usefully happen under the aegis of the UNFCCC. Other lessons in monitoring and verification might be learned from experience with the WTO, IMF, and OECD. Reform Bretton Woods and UN institutions Institutions that support global economic development have a large potential role in promoting low-carbon growth and adaptation to climate change. The World Bank. along with the regional development banks, has unique capacity to mobilize large amounts of capital for the sorts of investments that will be needed in low-carbon infrastructure. Several UN organizations, such as the United Nations Development Program and United Nations Environment Program. lack the ability to handle such large infrastructure projects but can play a major role in building relevant capacity in developing countries. All these organizations would benefit from both clear strategies for supporting climate action and increased related funding. They might also, more controversially, consider promoting policy shifts through conditionality on their assistance. For example, the World Bank might condition assistance in increasing energy supply on efforts to moderate demand through subsidy reform. Such steps would be difficult politically but would not be unprecedented. Set up substantial international funds for low-carbon technology finance International financial transfers in support of low-carbon development have occurred principally through carbon finance (i. e. offsets). Yet offsets are often an inefficient way of financially supporting low-carbon development. Many countries lack the capacity to administer robust offset systems yet could benefit from financial support for emissions-cutting activities. Offset schemes also often overpay, sometimes massively, for reductions dedicated funds could remove that waste. Funds can also be targeted at eliminating specific problems that stand in the way of private financial flows, by offering tailored products like risk guarantees and concessional loans. Funds can also target opportunities that are difficult to quantify for the purposes of offsets, such as investments in public transportation and long-distance grid infrastructure, or avoided deforestation, where measuring emissions changes is difficult. Make climate change a regular Group of Twenty agenda item Dealing with climate change will require high-level political leadership and deal-making of a sort that is difficult to achieve through formal negotiations with the 194 parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change by dedicated climate diplomats alone. Smaller gatherings that include heads of state and powerful cabinet ministers have the potential to unlock less rigid forms of cooperation and to find opportunities to trade across issue areas. Such meetings also provide a regular spotlight that can help hold leaders accountable for past promises in the absence of strong formal compliance mechanisms. The Group of Twenty (G20) has effectively replaced the Group of Eight (G8) as the main multilateral consultative forum for economic decision-making. Climate issues will largely be transferred there, though in the short term the G20 will remain primarily focused on finance as it was during its most recent summit in November 2011. The United States and other big emitters should likewise continue regular meetings of the Major Economies Forum, as a minilateral negotiating framework paralleland complementaryto the ongoing UNFCCC process. AQA GCSE - Unit 3 (P3,B3,C3) New specification papers. The old spec papers are also really useful to use, these can be found on the old spec site for past papers on AQA. The only thing you need to be careful about is what is in the spec, for example you dont need to answer questions on space for p3 Love this thread though, how and when are you guys going to start revising (Original post by grammar12 ) The old spec papers are also really useful to use, these can be found on the old spec site for past papers on AQA. The only thing you need to be careful about is what is in the spec, for example you dont need to answer questions on space for p3 Love this thread though, how and when are you guys going to start revising Yeah a lot of things have changed, one has to be careful and I need to start now as my teachers are not great Im probably going to summarise the CGP books and then make question cards. What about you (Original post by Efemena15 ) Yeah a lot of things have changed, one has to be careful and I need to start now as my teachers are not great Im probably going to summarise the CGP books and then make question cards. What about you Same really, two of my science teachers are great, but one is awful Ive bought these three revision guides and they are absolutely fantastic They are approved exclusively by AQA and they contain literally everything you need to know on every single unit (Im retaking unit 1 biology this summer which is included all in the same book) I really would recommend these books as AQA often look for key words in examinations and all of these are highlighted in the book. Basically, i would really recommend you to buy these books Im probably going to start revision on good friday for my summer exams, whilst battling with unfinished art coursework (Original post by grammar12 ) Same really, two of my science teachers are great, but one is awful Ive bought these three revision guides and they are absolutely fantastic They are approved exclusively by AQA and they contain literally everything you need to know on every single unit (Im retaking unit 1 biology this summer which is included all in the same book) I really would recommend these books as AQA often look for key words in examinations and all of these are highlighted in the book. Basically, i would really recommend you to buy these books Im probably going to start revision on good friday for my summer exams, whilst battling with unfinished art coursework I have those too I agree they are superb, i use them with the CGP books and it works a treat. Controlled assessments are frustrating I agree Im sitting all 3 as well as P1. What are your target grades Im predicted As in all three sciences. Was all As but now 2 in Physics and Chemsitry is more realistic with an A in Biology. Not too worried about that though as Im taking Maths. FMaths Chem and Physics at AS. How about you As for revision made a timetable last week but already not kept to it. -) My predicted are all As but have surpassed them in most exams The most recent ISA i did was for Chemistry but it was on something different. Cant remember at this moment in time, sorry My Chem ISA was on self-heating cans if I remember, Physics on Hooks Law and Bio on Osmosis and diffusion in a Potato. AQA GCSE - Unit 3 (P3,B3,C3) New specification papers. The old spec papers are also really useful to use, these can be found on the old spec site for past papers on AQA. The only thing you need to be careful about is what is in the spec, for example you dont need to answer questions on space for p3 Love this thread though, how and when are you guys going to start revising (Original post by grammar12 ) The old spec papers are also really useful to use, these can be found on the old spec site for past papers on AQA. The only thing you need to be careful about is what is in the spec, for example you dont need to answer questions on space for p3 Love this thread though, how and when are you guys going to start revising Yeah a lot of things have changed, one has to be careful and I need to start now as my teachers are not great Im probably going to summarise the CGP books and then make question cards. What about you (Original post by Efemena15 ) Yeah a lot of things have changed, one has to be careful and I need to start now as my teachers are not great Im probably going to summarise the CGP books and then make question cards. What about you Same really, two of my science teachers are great, but one is awful Ive bought these three revision guides and they are absolutely fantastic They are approved exclusively by AQA and they contain literally everything you need to know on every single unit (Im retaking unit 1 biology this summer which is included all in the same book) I really would recommend these books as AQA often look for key words in examinations and all of these are highlighted in the book. Basically, i would really recommend you to buy these books Im probably going to start revision on good friday for my summer exams, whilst battling with unfinished art coursework (Original post by grammar12 ) Same really, two of my science teachers are great, but one is awful Ive bought these three revision guides and they are absolutely fantastic They are approved exclusively by AQA and they contain literally everything you need to know on every single unit (Im retaking unit 1 biology this summer which is included all in the same book) I really would recommend these books as AQA often look for key words in examinations and all of these are highlighted in the book. Basically, i would really recommend you to buy these books Im probably going to start revision on good friday for my summer exams, whilst battling with unfinished art coursework I have those too I agree they are superb, i use them with the CGP books and it works a treat. Controlled assessments are frustrating I agree Im sitting all 3 as well as P1. What are your target grades Im predicted As in all three sciences. Was all As but now 2 in Physics and Chemsitry is more realistic with an A in Biology. Not too worried about that though as Im taking Maths. FMaths Chem and Physics at AS. How about you As for revision made a timetable last week but already not kept to it. -) My predicted are all As but have surpassed them in most exams The most recent ISA i did was for Chemistry but it was on something different. Cant remember at this moment in time, sorry My Chem ISA was on self-heating cans if I remember, Physics on Hooks Law and Bio on Osmosis and diffusion in a Potato.
No comments:
Post a Comment